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Abstract
Modern software is increasingly concurrent, timed, distributed, and therefore, non-deterministic. While
it is well known that tests can be generated as LTL or CTL model checker counterexamples, we argue
that non-determinism creates diﬃculties that need to be resolved and propose test generation methods to
overcome them. The proposed methods rely on fault modeling by mutation and use conventional (closed)
and modular (open) model checkers.
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1 Introduction
Test generation from deterministic speciﬁcations using veriﬁcation techniques and
tools is a well-known approach. It is suggested by [44] and reﬁned by several
authors, e.g., [13], [37], [8], [34], [36], [25], [20]. However, modern systems are
non-deterministic due to asynchrony, concurrency, multithreading, timing issues,
non-observable or non-controllable elements. Moreover, even if an implementation
under test (IUT) itself can be regarded as deterministic, in a model or speciﬁcation,
non-determinism may occur due to incompleteness of knowledge of implementation
choices, limitations of a modeling language, and abstractions. Conservative model
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abstraction is widely used to reduce complexity (state space) or to remove con-
structs, which are diﬃcult for simulation and veriﬁcation (e.g., time aspects [1]). In
declarative object oriented conceptual modeling, non-determinism allows to better
reﬂect inherent non-determinism of the domain, reduce complexity, and achieve a
better separation of concerns [4]. The problem of coping with non-determinism is
a long-standing one in protocol testing [10], [16], [17], [18], [19], [21], [35].
We present several approaches to test generation for non-deterministic speci-
ﬁcations. We argue that a non-deterministic speciﬁcation/implementation poses
certain diﬃculties, especially, when one targets not only weaker tests that allow for
inconclusive verdicts, but also tests that deliver deﬁnitive and conclusive results no
matter which system’s branch is executed. It is well known that derivation of tests
for nondeterministic models is more computationally diﬃcult or even impossible [1].
Moreover, we demonstrate in this paper that na¨ıve approaches for coping with non-
determinism could even simply fail, i.e., lead to inconsistent results. We deﬁne two
diﬀerent types of tests (weak and strong) which coincide in the case of deterministic
speciﬁcations. A weak test is usually associated with some assumptions, e.g., if a
test is executed suﬃciently often, all possible reactions of a non-deterministic IUT
are observed [29], [31]. Unfortunately, such assumptions do not apply to the case
when non-determinism occurs in the speciﬁcation due to conservative (or existen-
tial) abstraction. Thus we pay special attention to derivation of strong tests, also
known as separating sequences in the context of FSM (Finite State Machine) testing
[43].
Non-determinism could pose some problems even for white-box testing [24].
However, here we target the case of black-box (or functional) testing, when ad-
ditional diﬃculties occur due to lack of information on implementation details and
limited observation. Only input and output variables are observable. The state and
hidden (internal) variables of the IUT are not observable, so additional eﬀorts to
propagate faults to observable errors are required.
Among various test generation approaches we favor in this paper mutant-based
testing, which is one of the most complex, but promising strategies to detect faults
and ﬁght the state explosion [34], [9]. Unfortunately, this technique is often asso-
ciated with a so-called mutant explosion. While, traditionally, mostly determin-
istic mutants are considered, in [6] mutant-based test generation is extended for
non-deterministic mutants. Introducing non-deterministic mutants alleviates the
problem of mutant explosion and leads to a more general testing framework. Previ-
ously [36], we applied model checking to generate a conﬁrming sequence, kind of a
partial Unique Input Output sequence (UIO) [11], often used in FSM based testing
and related to state identiﬁcation and checking problems. Mutant-based technique
could be applied to generate UIO using a mutation operator that changes the set
of initial states to states which are not initial in the speciﬁcation [8] (at least for
speciﬁcation with no equivalent states) [40].
In the context of mutation-based testing, black-box testing is also sometimes
referred to as propagating faults to output. While the white-box testing (speciﬁ-
cation coverage) is often seen as a totally diﬀerent testing paradigm, there exists
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a connection between the two types of testing. In fact, to kill (detect) a mutant
obtained simply by mutating an output, a test that covers the aﬀected transition
(or, in the case of Moore machines or Kripke structures, a state) is necessary and at
the same time suﬃcient. The problem of ﬁnding mutant-killing tests can be reduced
to the problem of reaching states of a module composed of a speciﬁcation and faulty
sub-modules which satisfy a given property. This approach could be used to derive
tests that combine speciﬁcation coverage and fault propagation [36], [6]. However,
those interested in coverage based techniques could ﬁnd extensive literature elab-
orating usage of model checking tools for particular data or control ﬂow coverage
criteria, such as [13], [24], [39], [14].
For FSM, deterministic as well as non-deterministic, test generation is a well
studied theoretical problem, e.g., [22], [38], [35], [1]. However, methods developed
for classical FSM are rarely applied for real size speciﬁcations due to state explosion
problem. The current trend is to use model checking [12] technology, which embraces
various sophisticated optimization techniques to cope with state explosion problem,
such as BDD, partial orders, and SAT.
While previously we studied the problem of test derivation for a communicating
extended FSM (CEFSM) model [6], now we cast the problem in the framework of the
model checking theory which is traditionally based on Kripke structures and mod-
ules. In this paper, we generalize and further elaborate our and previously known
results for model checking driven test generation for the case of non-deterministic
speciﬁcations and implementations (mutants). Two types of tests, called strong and
weak, are distinguished. Some properties of these tests, such as their relation to
fairness are established. For the most general and diﬃcult case of non-determinism,
a novel test generation approach, based on modular model checking (module check-
ing) of a composition of the mutant and speciﬁcation is proposed. An incremental
test generation approach that involves observers (transformed speciﬁcations or mu-
tants) and traditional model checking is also outlined. Several special cases of test
generation which could be resolved with traditional model checking are discussed.
Counterexamples are built to demonstrate where na¨ıve approaches to test gener-
ation with model checkers fail. The deﬁnitions and results are cast in a formal
setting, based on the deﬁnition of a module which is often used in recent studies on
validation of component based and modular software.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces necessary deﬁ-
nitions of test, module, model checking, and module checking. Section 3 discusses
test generation from a counterexample derived by model or module checking in the
presence of non-determinism. Section 4 discusses how our results apply to the case
of multiple mutants. In Section 5, we brieﬂy discuss some related work and conclude
in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Here we introduce the necessary notions and notations. Unlike most of FSM testing
literature, which is usually based on Mealy machines [29], our work is based on the
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notion of a module, which could be seen as a Kripke structure with a partition
of atomic propositions onto input, output, and internal (hidden) [27]. In Mealy
machines, diﬀerently from Kripke structures, the labels are assigned to transitions
and not to states. In some cases, Mealy machines allow for more intuitive and
compact speciﬁcations than Kripke structures, especially in the black-box testing
context. However, our choice is motivated by the fact that temporal logics, used in
model checking, are traditionally deﬁned over Kripke structures. As we later show,
the input-output behavior of a module could be modeled by a Mealy machine. In
the presence of hidden variables, the model of extended ﬁnite state machine [36]
could be used to obtain a compact representation of the module.
2.1 Model Checking
A Kripke structure is a tuple Kr = (AP ,W,R,W0, L), where
• AP is the set of atomic propositions;
• W is the set of states;
• R ⊆ W ×W is the transition relation;
• W0 ⊆ W is the set of initial states;
• L:W → 2AP is the labeling function which maps each state into a set of atomic
propositions that hold in this state.
For (w,w′) ∈ R, we say that w′ is a successor of w. We say that a Kripke
structure is deadlock-free if every state w has at least one successor.
An inﬁnite sequence of state successors is called a path. A path, starting from
an initial state is called an execution path. A path is called fair [42] if for each state
that occurs inﬁnitely often in the path each outgoing transition is taken inﬁnitely
often. Usually, model checking deals only with inﬁnite sequences. A work-around
to deal with ﬁnite executions is to inﬁnitely repeat the last state.
In this paper, atomic propositions are also seen as Boolean variables, which
valuate to 1 (true) when corresponding propositions hold in the state and to 0
(false) otherwise.
Hereafter, we deal only with usual CTL syntax and semantics over deadlock-free
Kripke structures [15], [27]. Temporal logics extend the usual propositional logic
with temporal combinators Finally (eventually), Globally (universally), Until, and
path quantiﬁers All and Exists [15]. Beside standard conjunction, disjunction, and
negation we use a logic equality combinator, denoted ϕ ↔ ψ, or simply ϕ = ψ.
Formulas, where each combinator F, G, U is immediately preceded by either
quantiﬁer A or quantiﬁer E, constitute a temporal logic CTL, often supported by
model checkers.
A model checking problem consists in checking whether a Kripke structure Kr
satisﬁes a formula ϕ in all the initial states, denoted Kr |= ϕ. A counterexample is
a path of the Kripke structure, path preﬁx, or set of paths (in case of a complicated
CTL property) that causes formula violation. Most model checkers report one or
several minimum counterexamples.
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2.2 Modular Speciﬁcations
A composition of two Kripke structures Kr = (AP ,W,R,W0, L) and Kr ′ =
(AP ′,W ′, R′,W ′0, L′) is a Kripke structure Kr ‖ Kr ′ = (AP ′′,W ′′, R′′,W ′′0 , L′′),
where
• AP ′′ = AP ∪AP ′;
• W ′′ = {(w,w′):L(w) ∩AP ′ = L′(w′) ∩AP};
• R′′ = {((w,w′)(s, s′)): (w, s) ∈ R, (w′, s′) ∈ R′} ∩W ′′;
• W ′′0 = (W0 ×W ′0) ∩W ′′;
• L′′(w,w′) = L(w) ∪ L(w′) for (w,w′) ∈ W ′′.
Thus, the composition synchronizes over state labels shared by the components.
In other words, each state of the composition is composed of state of the ﬁrst com-
ponent and state of the second component, such that each atomic proposition that
belongs to both Kripke structures is present or absent in both states simultaneously.
A module is a triple (Kr , I, O), where Kr = (AP ,W,R,W0, L) is a Kripke
structure, and I,O ⊆ AP are disjoint sets of input and output variables. H =
AP \ (I ∪O) is called the set of hidden (internal) variables. While hidden variables
may appear redundant, we need them here for technical reasons. A module is closed,
if I = ∅, otherwise it is open. Intuitively, in every state w, the module reads L(w)∩I,
stores internally L(w)∩H, and outputs L(w)∩O. Inp(w) = L(w)∩ I is called the
input of the module in the state w. Out(w) = L(w) ∩O is called the output of the
module in the state w.
A module is called deterministic if for each state w and each i ⊆ I, w has at
most one successor state s with the input Inp(s) = i, moreover, for all w, s ∈ W0
Inp(w) = Inp(s) implies w = s. A module is non-deterministic, otherwise.
Given a sequence w1, w2, . . . , wk of successor states of a mod-
ule (Kr , I, O), starting from an initial state, we say that (Kr , I, O)
produces an output sequence Out(w1)Out(w2) . . .Out(wk) in re-
sponse to an input sequence Inp(w1)Inp(w2) . . . Inp(wk), while
Inp(w1)Out(w1)Inp(w2)Out(w2) . . . Inp(wk)Out(wk) is called an input-output
sequence.
Similar to Mealy machines, a module (Kr , I, O) is called observable [43], if the
module (Kr , I∪O, ∅), obtained from the initial module by moving all the output vari-
ables into the input variable set, is deterministic. Otherwise, the module (Kr , I, O)
is called non-observable. Intuitively, observable non-determinism is a simple form
of non-determinism, when a path, taken by the module, could be deduced from the
observed input-output sequence. Non-observable non-determinism is harder to deal
with. Fortunately, for each non-observable module, an observable module with the
same set of input-output sequences exists. Such module can be constructed by a
well known powerset construction procedure.
Input i is enabled in the state w if w has at least one successor state s with input
Inp(s) = i. Otherwise, input is disabled. A module is input enabled (completely
deﬁned) if each input labels an initial state and is enabled in every state. In this
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paper, we consider only input enabled speciﬁcation and mutant modules, and, hence,
deadlock-free.
a) 
1/10/0
b) c)
d)
0/0
0/1
1/1
1/10/0
1/10/0
1 /0
w2w1 w2 w2w1 w1
w3 w4
Fig. 1. a) The speciﬁcation; b) and c) mutants; d) Mealy machine.
A module, which constitutes our running example of a speciﬁcation is shown
in Fig. 1a. For simplicity, values of the input variable i and the output variable
o are depicted as pairs of Boolean values. Each state has a unique label. The
speciﬁcation has two states, w1 labeled with 0/0, and w2 labeled with 1/1, both
states are initial. The speciﬁcation can also be represented as a Mealy machine
(Fig. 1d). The transition relations of all the modules are deﬁned in such way that
states, where i = o = 0 or i = o = 1, and only them, are successors of all the other
states. All three modules in Fig. 1 are input enabled.
A composition of the modules M = (KrM , IM , OM ) and S = (KrS , IS , OS),
such that no hidden variable of one module is a variable of another (APM ∩HS =
APS ∩ HM = ∅), and sets of output variables are disjoint (OS ∩ OM = ∅), is
M ‖ S = (KrM ‖ KrS , (IM ∪ IS) \ (OM ∪OS), (OM ∪OS)). If needed, output and
hidden variables are renamed for the composition. Note that our deﬁnition allows
common inputs in the module composition.
A union of the modules M = (KrM , IM , OM ), where KrM =
(APM ,WM , RM ,WM0 , L
M ) and S = (KrS , IS , OS), where KrS =
(APS ,WS , RS ,WS0 , L
S) with mutually exclusive state sets is the module
M ∪ S = ((APM ∪ APS ,WM ∪WS , RM ∪RS ,WM0 ∪WS0 , L), IM ∪ IS , OM ∪OS),
where L(w) = LM (w) if w ∈ WM , and L(w) = LS(w) if w ∈ WS . If the state sets
intersect, states could be renamed. One can easily see that the set of input-output
sequences of the union is the union of sets of input-output sequences of the original
modules.
Model checking of speciﬁcations with inﬁnite state space is limited to small to
medium speciﬁcations and undecidable in the most general case. Thus, hereafter,
we consider only modules with ﬁnite number of states, variables, and propositions.
2.3 Module Checking
A module satisﬁes ϕ if the Kripke structure of the module satisﬁes ϕ. However,
a formula (property) that holds on a module in isolation does not always hold
when the module is embedded into a system of communicating modules. Often it
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is important that a property is satisﬁed when the module reactively communicates
with other (possibly unknown) modules. To address this problem, a new technique,
more general than conventional model checking, is introduced [27].
A module M reactively satisﬁes ϕ, denoted M |=r ϕ, if E ‖ M |= ϕ for all
deadlock-free modules E ‖ M , where E is a module such that no hidden variables of
one module is a variable of another module, and no output variable of one module
is an output variable of another module. The module E represents a possible
environment that does not block the module M . Checking reactive satisfaction
of a formula constitutes the problem of modular model checking with incomplete
information or module checking, for short [27]. For LTL, module checking coincides
with model checking.
2.4 Testing
We consider here mutation-based test generation, where faults are modeled using the
same formalism as a speciﬁcation, and mutants are obtained from the speciﬁcation
by applying mutation operations. While mutation is traditionally performed on
code, recently, a variety of speciﬁcation mutation operators is suggested [9], [34].
Let S be a module that models a speciﬁcation and M be a module that models
a faulty implementation (mutant) that share the same sets of input and output
variables.
A ﬁnite sequence of inputs i1 . . . ik, where ij ⊆ I, is called a weak test for S and
M if in response to it M produces an output sequence that S cannot.
A ﬁnite sequence of inputs i1 . . . ik is called a strong test for S and M if any
output sequence M produces in response to i1 . . . ik cannot be produced by S.
While, in certain cases, it might be more eﬃcient to use a test suite or adaptive
(on-the-ﬂy) tests instead of simple tests deﬁned above, for simplicity, in this work,
we target only single preset tests.
If S and M are deterministic, the notions of strong and weak tests coincide; in
the non-deterministic case, a weak test may exist even when there is no strong test.
2.4.1 Weak Tests and Fairness
Here we show that, under fairness assumption, repeatedly executed (a suﬃcient
number of times) weak test reveals a fault. In order to be able to repeat a test, a
reliable reset to set the module into all its initial states is needed. Such a reliable
reset could be modeled as follows. Let Sreset and Mreset be modules obtained from
the original modules by adding a reset input variable to both S and M . Each
original initial state is replaced by a reset state with the same variables along with
the designated variable reset and the same set of successors. Each reset state is a
successor of all states. Let (i1 . . . ik)ω be a module, which inﬁnitely often repeats
i1i2 . . . ik as its output (which, in our case, become inputs for other modules). The
following proposition holds.
Proposition 2.1 If i1 . . . ik is a weak test for S and M , then each fair execu-
tion path of Mreset ‖ (i1 . . . ik{reset})ω and each fair execution path of Sreset ‖
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(i1 . . . ik{reset})ω contain diﬀerent output sequences.
Obviously, no weak test exists, if and only if each input-output sequence of
the mutant is also an input-output sequence of the speciﬁcation. In case of a
deterministic speciﬁcation, a weak test does not exist if and only if the speciﬁcation
and mutant have the same set of input-output sequences.
2.4.2 Strong Tests
If there exists a strong test for modules S and M , these two modules are called sep-
arable (similar to non-deterministic FSM, see, e.g., [43]). In case of a deterministic
speciﬁcation, a strong test does not exist if and only if each input-output sequence
of the speciﬁcation is also an input-output sequence of the faulty module.
A strong test is symmetric: each strong test for a pair (S,M) is also a strong
test for (M,S), i.e., it is not important which of the two is the speciﬁcation or the
mutant.
2.4.3 Complexity Issues and Justiﬁcation for Modular Model Checking
Derivation of strong tests and its complexity is discussed by Alur et al [1], where
strong tests for two modules are referred as preset distinguishing strategies for two
machines. A preset distinguishing strategy is seen as a winning strategy for a
(blindfold) ∃∀ game with incomplete information. Since such games are PSpace
complete, the same is true for the preset distinguishing strategy existence problem,
and the length of a preset distinguishing sequence is exponential (in the worst case).
The proposed method for the preset distinguishing strategy generation is based on
derivation of a special type of a power set module of exponential size that resembles
Gill’s successor tree [22]. Thus, such an automaton could be constructed and fed to
a model checker. However, model checking technology still may face diﬃculties with
large space state and speciﬁcation size. Thus, we try to build a smaller speciﬁcation,
applying a game-theoretic model checking known as module checking.
At the same time, we discuss possible use of more traditional and widespread
LTL or CTL model checking techniques for simpler cases of the most general prob-
lem. Moreover, we show that candidate test veriﬁcation and, hence, incremental
test derivation is possible for non-deterministic speciﬁcations and mutants. Yet, we
doubt that one could use conventional LTL or (non-modular) CTL model checking
technique to derive strong test or decide its existence without signiﬁcant computa-
tional eﬀorts on the model transformation. An exponential growth of the size of
the system or property being model checked is expected. Indeed, the complexity of
CTL model checking is linear in terms of state space, while ﬁnding strong tests is
PSpace-complete.
3 Test Generation by Model and Module Checking
Test generation for a deterministic speciﬁcation and deterministic mutant modules is
well understood. However, we ﬁrst cast this problem in our framework to generalize
it later for non-deterministic cases.
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3.1 Deterministic Case
For the deterministic case we deﬁne a system that consists of a speciﬁcation and
mutant modules. Then we model check a formula that states equality of the outputs
of speciﬁcation and mutant modules, so a counterexample will give a test. In our
framework, this simple idea could be formalized as follows.
In order to compose modules with common hidden and output variables O∪H,
we introduce a renaming operator. Formally, the renaming operator ′ is deﬁned on
hidden and output variables of a module: (p)′ = p′, where p′ is not in the set of the
atomic propositions of these modules. We lift the operator to sets of variables and
modules. Also, let p = p′ hold in a state when both atomic propositions p and p′
are simultaneously hold or do not hold in this state.
Theorem 3.1 Let S = (KrS , I, O) and M = (KrM , I, O) be two deterministic
modules with the same input and output variables.
S ‖ M ′ |= AG
∧
p∈O
(p = p′)
if and only if there is no (strong or weak) test.
∧
p∈O(p = p
′) is a shorthand for o1 = o′1 ∧ o2 = o′2 ∧ . . . ∧ o|O| = o′|O|, which
formally denotes the equality of outputs of S and M (While a more elegant formula,
Out ′ = (Out)′ could be used instead; some readers may ﬁnd it confusing.)
The idea of the proof is as follows. The set of output variables of the composition
S ‖ M ′ is O ∪O′. The composition is synchronized only by input in the sense that
for each pair of execution paths of modules S and M ′, that share the same sequence
of inputs, pairs of states form an execution path of the composition. Each execution
path of composition is a sequence of pair of states of execution paths of S and M ′,
that correspond to the same input sequences. The logic formula simply states that
each output variable o ∈ O always valuates as the corresponding renamed variable
o′ on each path of the composition. That is the output of M coincides with the
output of S for each input sequence, which is a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for the absence of strong test for two modules.
Note that formula in Theorem 3.1 belongs both to CTL and LTL. Since LTL
module checking coincides with model checking, S ‖ M ′ |= AG∧p∈O(p = p′) is
equivalent to S ‖ M ′ |=r AG
∧
p∈O(p = p
′).
An input sequence deﬁned by a (ﬁnite) counterexample to the expression in
Theorem 3.1 constitutes a strong test case. This fact is known and widely exploited.
Indeed, the set of such input sequences, deﬁned by counterexamples, and the set of
strong tests coincide.
Example. To illustrate Theorem 3.1, we consider the modules shown in Fig. 1a
and Fig. 1b. While the speciﬁcation always reacts to input i = 1 with output o = 1,
the mutant starts with output o = 0. Thus, S ‖ M ′ |= AG(o = o′) does not hold.
i = 1 is both the shortest counterexample and the shortest test.
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3.2 Non-Deterministic Mutant
3.2.1 Weak Test Derivation
Even if a speciﬁcation is deterministic, a mutant may still exhibit some non-
determinism, e.g., related to data races or abstraction. This is why it is interesting
to consider the case of a deterministic speciﬁcation and non-deterministic mutants.
Theorem 3.2 Let S = (KrS , I, O) and M = (KrM , I, O) be two modules with
the same input and output variables, where S is deterministic, while M is possibly
non-deterministic.
S ‖ M ′ |= AG
∧
p∈O
(p = p′)
if and only if there is no weak test for S and M ′.
As we noted before, S ‖ M ′ |= AG∧p∈O(p = p′) is equivalent to S ‖ M ′ |=r
AG
∧
p∈O(p = p
′).
An input sequence deﬁned by a ﬁnite counterexample to the above formula could
serve as a weak test.
Example 3.3 Consider the speciﬁcation in Fig. 1a and the mutant as in Fig. 1b,
but with all three states being initial. i = 1 is a weak test, since the mutant can
produce the output o = 0, which the speciﬁcation cannot produce in response to
the input i = 1. At the same time, the mutant can produce output o = 1, as the
speciﬁcation.
Determinism of the speciﬁcation is essential. In the case when both modules are
non-deterministic, the formula AG
∧
p∈O(p = p
′) could be violated even when no
strong or weak test exists. For example, let both, speciﬁcation and faulty, modules
be as in Fig. 1b, but with all states being initial. Thus, both modules are non-
deterministic and coincide. The formula of Theorem 3.2 does not hold, since there
exists an execution path, such that o = o′ already in the ﬁrst state (w2, w3), though
no weak test exists.
3.2.2 Strong Test Generation
In order to determine a strong test, we ﬁrst replace a non-observable mutant by
an observable one with the same set of input-output sequences. The following
proposition states that this transformation does not aﬀect test existence.
Proposition 3.4 If M1 and M2 have the same set of input-output sequences then
each strong test for S and M1 is also a strong test for S and M2.
The idea behind strong test derivation relies on transforming an observable mu-
tant module into an observer [23]. We build a module Obs(M) for a given module
M by the following sequence of transformations. Each output of the original module
becomes an input of the new module. A hidden variable found is deﬁned, thus, if
present, original hidden variables are removed. If needed, determinization is per-
formed by powerset construction. In all non-trivial cases, the obtained module is
S. Boroday et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 190 (2007) 3–1912
not input enabled due to inputs, obtained from the output set OM of the original
module M . The module is completed to an input enabled module with a set of
additional sink states. The variable found valuates true only in these states. More
formally, for each state and each disabled input i, a successor sink state, labeled
with i ∪ {found} is added. For each input i that does not label an initial state, an
additional initial state labeled with i∪{found} is deﬁned. Each of the added states
is a successor of all the other added states.
Note that determinization is required only for non-observable module M; oth-
erwise, the obtained module is deterministic due to performed inversion of outputs
into inputs. Possibly, approximate conservative determinization [41] could be ap-
plied.
The following holds for the obtained modules.
Theorem 3.5 Let S = (KrS , I, O) and M = (KrM , I, O) be two modules with
the same input and output variables, where S is deterministic, while M is possibly
non-deterministic.
S ‖ Obs(M) |= AG found
if and only if there is no strong test.
Note that, since LTL module checking coincides with model checking, S ‖
Obs(M) |= AG found is equivalent to S ‖ Obs(M) |=r AG found .
3.3 Non-Deterministic Modules
3.3.1 Weak Test
A weak test can also be generated using a composition of a module with an observer.
However, the observer should be built from the speciﬁcation, rather than from the
mutant.
Theorem 3.6 Let S = (KrS , I, O) and M = (KrM , I, O) be two modules with the
same input and output variables.
M ‖ Obs(S) |= AG found
if and only if there is no weak test case for S and M .
Note that, since LTL module checking coincides with model checking, M ‖
Obs(S) |= AG found is equivalent to M ‖ Obs(S) |=r AG found .
3.3.2 Strong Test Veriﬁcation
The case of strong test derivation when both speciﬁcation and mutants are non-
deterministic is the most complex among those considered here, one may use ap-
proximation or ad-hoc methods to solve it. In this case, a veriﬁcation procedure
may be needed. Thus, we discuss how to check whether a candidate input sequence
constitutes a strong test.
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In order to model check whether a given candidate input sequence is a test, we
deﬁne a tester module, called Tester, which simply feeds a given sequence to the
speciﬁcation and mutants. Tester(α) for a given input sequence α = i1 . . . ik, is a
module with the empty set of input variables, a hidden variable (ﬂag) h, the set
of states {w0, w1, . . . , wk}, and transition relation {(wj , wj+1): 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1} ∪
{(wk, wk)}, the labeling function L such that L(wj) = ij+1 for 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, and
L(wk) = {h}. The loop (wk, wk) and a ﬂag h are needed, because in our framework,
inspired from [27] model checking (as well as module checking) is deﬁned only on
deadlock-free modules.
Theorem 3.7 Let S = (KrS , I, O) and M = (KrM , I, O) be two modules with the
same input and output variables and α be an input sequence.
S ‖ M ′ ‖ Tester(α) |= AFh ∨
∧
p∈O
(p = p′)
if and only if the input sequence α is a strong test.
The idea of the proof is as follows. The formula formalizes the intuition that
a test is strong if it guarantees that in the course of test execution, a mutant,
sooner or later (eventually), produces an output, diﬀerent from any output that the
speciﬁcation is capable of.
Note that S ‖ M ′ ‖ Tester(α) |=r AFh ∨
∧
p∈O(p = p′) is equivalent to S ‖ M ′ ‖
Tester(α) |= AFh ∨∧p∈O(p = p′).
For most of complete model checking algorithms and tools, which compose mod-
ules prior to property analysis, replacing M ′ by Obs(M) may somewhat reduce space
state, but the gain is relatively small for on-the-ﬂy model checking, when only a frag-
ment of the composition, which is relevant to the property, is usually constructed.
An incremental generation of a strong test can be performed by consecutive veriﬁ-
cation of all candidates of a given length. If the state number of modules is ﬁnite,
an upper bound of the test is known [1]. Technically, it is possible to deﬁne a mod-
ule that consecutively tries all possible test candidates of the given length. Such
approach could be faster than model checking multiple systems, but we do not see
how it could be organized eﬃciently in the terms of the memory consumption.
3.3.3 Strong Test Derivation by Module Checking
To derive a strong test for the most general case, when both speciﬁcation and
mutant are non-deterministic, we introduce two auxiliary operators. One operator
HideOut(Kr , I, O) = (Kr , I, ∅) is a blindfold operator. Intuitively, the blindfold
operator preserves the structure and inputs of the original module, but hides output
variables from the environment, by placing them into the set of hidden variables
of the resulting module. Another additional operator 1 AddIn, which adds a new,
single initial state w0, such that L(w0) = ∅, and transitions from w0 lead to all the
former initial states (and only to them).
1 This operator is needed only for non-deterministic speciﬁcations or mutants, which have several diﬀerent
initial states that share same input.
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Theorem 3.8 Let S = (KrS , I, O) and M = (KrM , I, O) be two modules with the
same input and output variables.
HideOut(AddIn(S ‖ M ′)) |=r EG
∧
p∈O
(p = p′)
if and only if there is no strong test for S and M .
The intuition behind this statement is that two modules produce at least one
common output sequence for any input sequence if and only if there is no strong
test for these two modules. Input sequences are produced by a module checking
environments. The condition of a blind environment is needed since here we are
not interested in adaptive testers and testers that could prevent (block) certain
outputs. Blindness of environment ensures that the formula is reactively satisﬁed if
and only if it is satisﬁed for all the possible environments each state of which has
a single successor. Thus, multiple tests are not addressed. Therefore, the reactive
satisfaction of the formula of Theorem 3.8 on the blindfolded composition of the
speciﬁcation with the mutant formalizes the above necessary and suﬃcient condition
of strong test non-existence. Since module checking allows for both, output sensitive
(adaptive) and blind, environments, we hide the outputs of the composition with a
designated operator HideOut. Note that O in the formula does not refer to the set
of output variables of HideOut(AddIn(S ‖ M ′)). O denotes the set of the output
variables of the original module S = (KrS , I, O). In HideOut(AddIn(S ‖ M ′)) these
variables are hidden.
While, unlike the previous cases, a minimum counterexample may involve several
execution paths, it will provide a unique ﬁnite input sequence. To obtain a strong
test, though, one should disregard the ﬁrst (empty) input of this sequence.
Note, since the formula uses path existence quantiﬁcation, it does not belong
to any universal logic. In this case, replacing reactive satisfaction by usual would
change the meaning of the formula. In the context of the conventional model check-
ing, formula of Theorem 3.8 would state that each suﬃciently long sequence of in-
puts constitutes a strong test for given S and M . Possibly, in (conventional) model
checking setting, a speciﬁc for M (but still independent from S) non-separability
condition could be expressed in the form of the so-called tree automaton [26], but
we doubt that this is always possible in CTL.
4 Multiple Mutants
Here we discuss derivation of a test which targets several mutants. The prob-
lem could be reduced to the case of a single mutant by merging a set of mutants
{M1, . . . ,Ml} into a single module M1 ∪ . . . ∪Ml.
Proposition 4.1 An input sequence is a strong test for S and the module M1 ∪
. . .∪Ml if and only if it is a strong test for S and each of the modules M1, . . . ,Ml.
The proposition does not hold for weak tests.
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Such transformation of several mutants into meta-mutant should be considered
with care, since a test for the speciﬁcation and the meta-mutant may not exist even
if there exists a single test for each mutant. Consider the following example.
Example. Consider the speciﬁcation in Fig. 1a, and mutants in Fig. 1b and
Fig. 1c. The ﬁrst mutant has an additional state w3 labeled with 1/0, the initial
states are w1 and w3. The second mutant has an additional state w4 labeled with
0/1, the initial states are w2 and w4. Any strong test for the speciﬁcation and the
ﬁrst mutant should start with i = 1. Similarly, any strong test for the speciﬁcation
and the second mutant should start with i = 0. Thus, there is no single test for the
speciﬁcation and both mutants at the same time.
A ﬁner approach is to build a composition of the speciﬁcation with all the
mutants. However, outputs of each of them should be renamed. Unlike the case of
the merged modules, for such a multi-component composition, the testing remains
tractable even if there is no input sequence that is a strong (weak) test with respect
to all the mutants. For example, the problem of deriving a test which is strong for a
maximal number of mutants could be considered, similar to a conﬁrming sequence,
a kind of partial UIO, generation [37]. Such an optimization problem may look alien
to classical model checking, but many model checking tools, such as ObjectGeode
[33], provide means to collect statistics. Possibly, certain metrics, which assign a
weight for each mutant, could be implemented.
5 Related Work
As far as we know, reuse of veriﬁcation techniques for test generation is ﬁrst sug-
gested in [44], though, in our opinion, treatment on non-determinism is rather rudi-
mentary in this work. In order to cope with non-determinism in a speciﬁcation, [34]
suggests synchronizing non-deterministic choices, i.e., in value of variables that are
updated in a non-deterministic fashion (for the case when each state is uniquely de-
ﬁned by the values of variables). In terms of SMV language, it consists in declaring
a variable global and removing update operations from a mutant. The approach,
as suggested, works in simple cases. However, it is not clear how it applies to the
most general case. For example, we consider the case when one hidden variable
is updated in a non-deterministic fashion, but its value is revealed via an output
variable only in a next step. The approach of [34] could result in the false tests
for mutations that negate the output value in that step. Our observer based test
generation could be seen as a more general version of the method sketched in [34].
Some obstacles in test generation for tricky coverage criteria from CTL model
checking counterexample are resolved by adding an additional logic operator [24]. In
this paper, instead of applying a rare temporal logic, we cope with non-determinism
using module checking.
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6 Conclusion
We discussed diﬃculties in test generation for non-deterministic systems not only
using complexity-theoretical arguments, but also by demonstrating how na¨ıve ap-
proaches may fail and proposed several solutions, which allow one to use a modular
or conventional CTL (and, sometimes, LTL) model checker to generate tests auto-
matically. As usually, counterexamples, generated by a model checker, could be used
to build tests. We demonstrated that in the most general case of non-deterministic
speciﬁcations and implementations, the existence of a test could be veriﬁed using
the module checking approach. Alternatively, an incremental approach, where each
candidate test is veriﬁed using a conventional model checking is proposed. While
the incremental approach may appear ineﬃcient, our preliminary experiments [7]
give encouraging results. Moreover, incremental approach could rely on a larger
range of tools and make possible the use of eﬃcient techniques of bounded model
checking [5], when the behavior of the speciﬁcation is analyzed only on executions
of a given length.
Our future plans include test derivation experiments with module checking and
contingent AI planning. In view of a currently rather limited choice of module
checking tools, we hope that our ideas of using module checking for test derivation
could motivate development of new algorithms and tools.
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